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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the causes and consequences of cross-border
acquisitions in a transition economy using the 1998-2006 deal data for targeted
Chinese and Indian firms and foreign acquirers. Our empirical analysis resulted in
three important findings. First, firms with high cash reserve ratio are likely to be
targeted in the recent cross-border acquisition trends in China and India; remarkably
so when the cash-rich target has a high growth opportunity. Second, cross-border
acquisitions bring higher shareholders’ values for foreign acquirers than for domestic
acquirers. Third, these empirical results differ from existing literature where
acquirer’s shareholder’s return is low in general.
JEL Classification: O21, O25, G34
Keywords: Transition economy, Mergers and acquisition
I. Introduction
There is a vast literature on corporate acquisitions including several empirical
studies on the causes and consequences of mergers. Some suggested technological
innovations, industrial deregulations and changes in demographic structures as the
major causes. Others reported that acquisitions brought about both positive and
negative impacts in the post-acquisition period. Most of the literature used datasets of
U.S. firms, but the number of studies using data from other countries has recently
increased as merger waves hit other countries around the world. Clearly, there is an
increasing merger wave hitting not only the industrialized countries, but also
emerging countries as the latter promote economic transition by releasing
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2state-owned shares.
In East Asia, the number of acquisitions by foreign firms dramatically
increased after the 1997/98 financial crisis. One of the causes cited was the enhanced
purchasing power of foreign acquirers following the currency devaluation and falling
stock prices in the region. Other triggers mentioned included the widespread
privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation of capital transactions. Ten
years after the crisis, however, the number of corporate acquisitions has been
increasing still, especially in emerging countries. Remarkably, transition economies
that did not experience currency crisis recorded even larger number of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As). One possible reason for this dramatic increase is that foreign
firms have become more aggressive purchasers of the released shares of state-owned
enterprises, at the same time that governments in transition economies have been
promoting inward investments by deregulating the existing legislations.
According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, total
international direct investment exceeded US$ 1,300 billion in 2006 with a significant
increase contributed by the emerging countries. In fact, cross-border corporate
acquisitions accounted for sixty seven percent of international direct investment flow
in the same year. The Chinese Eleventh Five-year plan of 2006 explains how the
government regards the recent acquisition trend and the purpose of inward
investment promotion policy. Specifically, the government expects cross-border
acquisition to bring with it advanced technology, stronger managerial discipline, and
wider international delivery channels in addition to large equity funds. Against this
background, merger waves can be expected to hit both industrialized and emerging
countries more frequently, resulting in higher international direct investments. For
emerging transition economies, governments are more likely to pursue M&As to
activate stagnating firms.
More recent literature using U.S. sample firms pointed out three factors that
contribute to corporate value maximization from acquisitions. First, an acquisition
enables the acquirer to obtain new technology and higher productivity1. Second, the
acquirer expects the corporate acquisition to improve the managerial discipline of the
targeted firm as noted by Morck et al.(1998) and Lang et.al.(1989). Third,
shareholders’ potential rights to eliminate nonperforming managers contribute to an
increase in corporate value regardless of the elimination by acquisition. This is also
suggested by the above literatures. Chari et al. (2008) use cross-country data to
investigate shareholder value gains from target acquisition, and find that acquiring a
control over a target can bring high abnormal returns, especially for firms from the
1 Andrade et.al.(2001) and Mitchell and Mulherin(1996) pointed out that merger wave hits a limited
number of industries during a short-term period. But, when the industrial sectors experienced
technological innovation, deregulation and other factors that contribute to a dramatic change in industry
productivity, a merger wave likely follows.
3developed countries. However, there is only sparse literature on M&As focusing on
transition economies such as China and India.
It is possible that the Chinese and the Indian governments promoted
corporate acquisition because of its potential benefits, e.g, synergy effect and
managerial discipline, on the privatized state-owned firms. In the case of cross-border
acquisitions, the expected return from a transfer of new technology, management
know-how, and more international delivery channels seem to be attractive enough to
increase the productivity of quasi state-owned firms in China and India. Therefore,
since the existing literature cannot be used to fully explain the recent acquisition trend
in transition economies, we believe that studies focusing on the transition economies
are quite valuable. In this paper, we analyze the effects of M&As on the process of
economic development in China and India.
This paper will examine three propositions. The first is to verify common
characteristics of target firms that foreign acquirers prefer. We will empirically test the
factors that influence the foreign acquirer’s investment decision by looking at
characteristics of targets. The second is to find out how the capital market evaluates
the announcement of cross-border acquisition. In particular, the types of cross-border
acquisition that bring larger shareholder’s value will be examined. The third is to
verify and evaluate universal common characteristics of foreign acquirers that bring
larger shareholder’s value for both acquirers and targets. By using acquisition deal
data matched with firms’ financial statements, this paper will identify the causes and
consequences of cross-border acquisitions in China and India.
II. Testing Hypotheses and the Data
Table 1 suggests that the number of acquisitions in China and India
dramatically increased since 2002. In China, the number grew from 64 in 2001 to 227
in 2006. There was also a remarkable increase in the number of deals for the targeted
unlisted firms in both countries. In India, the ratio of publicly listed targets was high
until 1999, but it dramatically decreased since 2002. Foreign acquirers, meanwhile,
contributed to the higher number of unlisted targets in China and India with unlisted
firms targeted by foreign acquirers for both countries at more than thirty percent of
total deals.
Table 1 about here
In terms of targeted industrial group, Table 2 shows a large number of
targeted firms in real estate business and construction, reflecting the recent domestic
construction boom in Chinese and Indian metropolitan areas. The number of firms in
telecommunications is also large in China which can be attributed to the recent
4progress of deregulation in this sector since China joined WTO in 2001. The number in
financial services is also large in China and in the pharmaceutical industry in India.
These data point to the common trend of an increasing number in targeted firms in
the recently deregulated industrial groups. However, country specific factors also
exist as shown in Chinese financial business and Indian pharmaceutical industry.
Unlike Chari et al. (2008), who examine the consequences of acquisitions
especially for firms from the developed countries, we employ three approaches to
examine not only the consequences but also the factors encouraging cross-border
acquisitions in China and India, in order to analyze the effects of M&As on economic
development in transition economies. The first approach examines if determinants of
targets influencing an acquirer’s decision differ between cross-border and domestic
deals. The second approach verifies cumulative abnormal returns of cross-border and
domestic deals and compare them by using event study. This approach adopts the
methodology of Brown and Warners (1985) by statistically examining the differences
between cross-border and domestic deals. The third approach examines what type of
acquirers bring about high abnormal returns for both cross-border and domestic
deals.
The empirical data were obtained from Bloomberg’s “M&A League Table”.
The dataset covered all the announced data of the world including deals with low
percentage of stock holding ratio and even those in emerging countries. We also used
sample data of deals announced from January 1, 1998 - December 31, 2006. Sample
targeted firms refer to both listed and unlisted firms in China and India. We extracted
announced deals with more than fifty percent of targeted stock holding ratio,
lowering the ratio to 10 percent in analyzing targets’ characteristics. Differing from
existing studies focusing on target firms in the industrialized countries, we did not set
any lower bound for the total amount of deal value. The acquirers refer to all foreign
and domestic listed firms to compare these two empirical results, except firms in the
financial sector and utilities. We also excluded in the sample those acquirers with
more than two deals within five business operating days because it is difficult to
specify which deal influenced an increase in the acquirer’s stock price. Information on
type of payment in China and India are not covered by Bloomberg’s database and
difficult to obtain from any other databases, and are also excluded in this study2.
2 In China, “Provisional Rule of Corporate Acquisition by Foreigners” came into effect in April 2003．It is
generally viewed that the Chinese government has encouraged foreign institutional investors to acquire
a firm in China since then. This rule was adopted as a joint amendment by The Ministry of Commerce,
State Administration of Foreign Exchange and The China Securities Regulatory Commissions in
September 2006 as “A Rule for Foreign Investors to Acquire Chinese Firm”. The rule contains the
detailed regulations and allows foreign acquirers to employ stock as a method of payment.
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III. What types of targets attract foreigners?
This section addresses the characteristics of targets that influence the
investment decisions of foreign and domestic acquirers. There are several studies that
focused on this issue. By examining the free-cash flow problem and using it as a proxy
for non-working internal control mechanisms of the firm, Hartford (2005) suggested
that cash-rich firms are likely to be targeted. Hanson (1992) and Smith and Kim (1994)
pointed out another hypothesis that firms with good investment opportunities and
less financial resources have an incentive to acquire cash-rich firms. Taking another
approach, they’ve also concluded that cash-rich firms are likely to be targeted.
Hasbrouck (1985), however, has shown that firms with high growth opportunities are
less likely to be targeted because such firms do not need any external intervention.
Existing literature generally focus on the relationship between characteristics of
targets and efficiency of internal management mechanisms as suggested also by Lang
et al. (1991), Servaes (1991) and Mork et al.(1988). Our study also employs the same
variables since firms in a transition economy need more external intervention.
Our study uses the acquisition’s deal and financial data of the listed targets in
China and India from 1999 to 2006, and extracts deals with more than 10 percent
targeting share of stock acquisition. Reflecting the above literature together with the
Chinese and Indian country specific backgrounds, our first hypothesis is that the
volume of internal cash reserve influences an investment decision of acquirer for both
China and India. This is because there is stronger incentive for external intervention in
the internal corporate mechanism of cash-rich quasi state-owned firms under a share
releasing plan by the government. Our second hypothesis is that firms with high
growth opportunities are likely to be targeted, contrary to the findings of existing
literature. We consider foreign acquirers to have much larger purchasing power and
incentives to maximize returns when the target firms show good growth
opportunities.
Our empirical model as shown in equations (1.1) and (1.2) employs
announced targeted stock holding ratio as a dependent variable when the firm is the
target of an acquisition attempt and others are 0 in year t. The independent variables
are the three-year averaged financial data. Therefore, the dependent variables are
virtually the announced deals in 2001-2006. When a firm turns out as a target by the
announcement in year t, the firm is eliminated from the sample in the following year.
Six industrial dummy, five year dummy and five regional dummy variables are
added to the equations.
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SHR1: announced targeted stock holding ratio by foreign acquirer in year t, “=0” when the firm is not the
target of cross-border acquisition attempt in year t, SHR2 : announced targeted stock holding ratio by
domestic acquirer in year t, “=0” when the firm is not the target of domestic acquisition attempt in year t,
SIZE: Natural logarithm of book valued total assets, DER: Book valued total liability/market valued
capital, CASH: Book valued cash reserves/ Book valued total assets, FIXED: Book valued fixed
assets/Book valued total assets, ROA: Return on assets, , MBR: (Book valued total liability + Market
valued capital )/ Book valued total assets
Our empirical analysis showed that for cross-border acquisitions, parameters
of cash reserve ratio and the intersection between cash reserve and market to book
ratio are significantly positive in China, while cash reserve ratio and the intersection
variable are also both positively significant for Indian firms. These results confirm
our first hypothesis that firms with ample cash are likely to be targeted by foreign
acquirers in China and India. This variable is used as a proxy if there is a room for
improvement in the management of firms. Therefore, our empirical results suggest
that the cash rich Chinese and Indian firms would need acquirers’ intervention for
them to operate efficiently.
For acquisitions between domestic acquirers and targets in China, parameters
of firm size and book-to-market ratio are significant with the firm size negative and
that of book-to-market ratio positive. In India, parameters of firm size, cash reserve
ratio and intersection variable between cash reserve ratio and book-to-market ratio
are positively significant.
On the other hand, it is difficult to confirm our second hypothesis.
Parameters of market to book ratio in the case of cross-border acquisitions turned out
insignificant for both China and India. However, parameters of intersection variable
between cash reserve and book-to-market ratio are both significantly positive. This
suggests that a firm with high growth opportunities is attractive only when the firm
has ample cash reserves. The parameter firm size is negatively significant for Chinese
acquisitions. Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and Song and Walkling (1993) also reported
that size negatively relates to target incidence. Our study found a similar trend in this
variable. Parameters of several industrial dummy variables are significant. These
suggest that industrial effects are also important factors in the acquirers’ decision
making.
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IV. Do cross-border acquisitions increase shareholder’s value?
This section aims to verify the consequences resulting from the recent
acquisitions in China and India. Focusing on shareholders’ gains from acquisitions,
we examined if acquisitions contributed to an increase in shareholders’ values in
transition economies. Using the event study methodology, we considered stock price
as reflecting the future result of the acquisition. In other words, stock price right after
the announcement reflects expected economic value added obtained by acquisitions.
A standard event study methodology was adopted to calculate abnormal returns
originally developed by Brown and Warner (1985). The abnormal returns over
three-day event window (-1, 1) around the announcement date using market model
benchmark returns were estimated and market benchmark indexes were respectively
extracted from the mother country market of each acquirer. Some 40 one-day event
studies (-20, 20) were added to the above three-day event study. By calculating
abnormal returns of short-term and long-term period, we discussed the sources and
origins of the differences. The parameters for the market model were estimated over
the (-256,-21) interval.
Using the above cumulative abnormal returns, this paper investigates three
hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that foreign acquirers, i.e., cross-border
acquisitions, brought larger shareholders’ value than domestic acquirers. This
hypothesis comes from the observation that foreign shareholders of the industrialized
countries enhance the monitoring of corporate managers resulting in managerial
discipline. Jensen (1986, 1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1998) emphasized the
importance of shareholder’s monitoring citing as an example the improvement in
managerial discipline resulting from concentrated ownership structure. Chari et al.
(2008) show that the return to an acquirer gaining control of a target in a developed
country is significantly increased. In this paper, following the previous studies
mentioned above, we assume that acquisition by a foreign acquirer leads to
enhancement of monitoring in addition to obtaining international distribution
channels, new technology and other sources of high productivity. This approach is
close to the conclusion of Anderade et al. (2001), Hasbrouck (1985), Servaes (1991) and
Lang et al. (1989) that pointed out that targeted firms are generally low growth
opportunity firms and acquirers are able to improve the target firm’s managerial
discipline.3
3 There are several literature suggesting growth opportunity is not an appropriate proxy variable for a
change in managerial discipline. Differing from Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny
(2003), it is our stand that the variable represents managerial discipline as pointed out in Andrade et al.
8Our second hypothesis is that the shareholders of an acquirer receive larger
returns when the target is a publicly unlisted firm. This hypothesis is also based on
existing literature in the United States. For example, Chang (1998) and Hansen and
Lott (1996) examined returns from private acquisition targets. The former suggested
that unlisted firms have less concentrated ownership structure, hence, monitoring
management of the target firm does not always work. Hansen and Lott (1996) pointed
out the same view, but from another hypothesis. Their contention is that acquisition of
a public firm sometimes result in discounted shareholder value for the acquirer, and
the total value of the two firms are not maximized. However, when the target is a
private firm, the acquisition leads to maximization of shareholder’s portfolio, once the
target went IPO in the future. While Fuller et al. (2002) and other literature questioned
the above conclusions, our analysis assumes that, in a transition economy, acquisition
of private firms also leads to effective monitoring.
The third hypothesis on vertical acquisition, i.e., industrial sectors of
acquirers and targets are close, improves productivity in the industry and brings
higher shareholder’s value. In the United States, Berger and Ofek (1995) reported that
stock price of a diversified firm is undervalued because investors regard that the firm
misallocate the corporate resources and inefficiency exists inside. Morck et al. (1990)
and Bhagat et al. (2005) also reported that stock price of the firm is higher when the
industrial sectors of acquirer and target are close. Although some literature such as
Agrawal et al. (1992) and Sirower (1997) reported that stock price of the horizontal
acquisition brought higher stock price in their empirical results, we assume vertical
acquisition brings better efficiency in resource allocation between acquirer and target.
This section examines a sample using several criteria. The first criterion refers
to deals between both listed and private targets and publicly listed acquirers
announced from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2006. Deals with more than 50%
announced acquisitions and completed as of December 31, 2007 are extracted from the
sample. Banks, securities firms, insurance firms and other financial firms are excluded
as an acquirer from the sample. Other deals that the same acquirer announced in
five operating days are also excluded.
Table 4 shows the three-day and forty one-day cumulative abnormal returns
classified by type of deals. In table 4.A,. cumulative abnormal return is significantly
positive in China. However, when we differentiate the returns on the basis of
whether the acquirer is a foreign firm or Chinese firm, we find that the return is
significantly positive for foreign acquirers. As for the cumulative abnormal returns on
the basis of whether the target is a publicly listed firm or not in cross-border deals, we
find that the return is significantly higher when the target is unlisted firm. The
cumulative abnormal return is also significantly high when the foreign acquirer and
(2001) and other literature.
9domestic target belong to the same industry. To summarize, the above empirical
results suggest that a foreign acquirer belonging to the same industrial group as an
unlisted target provides the most significant positive additional shareholder’s value in
China.
Table 4.B shows the empirical results of acquisitions in India. The results of
the tests for all samples suggest that cumulative abnormal return of acquirer’s
shareholder is significantly positive in India as a whole. The returns of both
cross-border and domestic acquisitions are also significantly positive, but the
cross-border acquisition is significantly higher than the domestic. In testing for the
difference of cumulative abnormal returns between the listed and unlisted target, we
find that the returns are significantly higher when the target is unlisted in case of
cross-border acquisition. In India, empirical results suggest that the cumulative
abnormal return of own-industry acquisition is significantly higher in case of
cross-border acquisitions as well. The above results suggest that cross-border
acquisition also brings more significant additional shareholder’s value in India and
the returns are higher when the target is an unlisted firm and belongs to the same
industrial group.
Table 4. about here
V. Who is a good acquirer?
The third empirical analysis focuses on types of acquirers that bring high
cumulative abnormal returns. Existing literature on this issue relates to those
mentioned in the previous section. Lang et al. (1989) pointed out that acquirers with
high book-to-market ratio resulted in high cumulative abnormal returns in an 11-day
event around the announcement. This is because the acquirer with high
book-to-market ratio is expected to bring better efficiency in management for the
target. Servaes (1991) supported the above view suggesting that the target has a room
for efficiency improvement from an acquirer with high book-to-market ratio. In this
study, we assume that an acquirer with high book-to-market ratio also improves the
managerial discipline of firms in China and India. Moeller et al. (2004) , Dong et al.
(2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2002) pointed out that an acquirer’s firm size is
important in determining shareholder’s return based on their review of U.S.
acquisitions. We do agree that a small acquirer obtains relatively larger synergy effect
than large firms and we use the same hypothesis in this paper.
Four datasets are prepared to examine the types of acquirers, namely, two
datasets on CARs, financial data of acquirers and targets for cross-border deals in
China, and two others on CARs, financial data of acquirers and targets for
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cross-border deals in India. The sample period covers 2000 to 2005. The criterion used
to extract sample deal data of the acquisition is the same as in sections III and IV.
In completing the dataset, we first matched a firm’s individual CAR data,
financial data of acquirer and those of target. Here we employed (-1, 1) CAR data.
Next, we extracted firms that belong to the same industrial category of a target on
every deal. We regard these firms as potential targets, but not offered by acquirers.
We matched financial data of these potential targets and those of acquirers that
actually made deals with real targets on every deal. In this case, CAR is “0” since they
are not targeted after all by either foreign or domestic acquirer. The above targeted
data and potential targeted data are merged and we estimated the below empirical
equations with these merged data by using Tobit estimation.
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CAR1: Cumulative abnormal return of foreign acquirer (-1, 1), CAR2: Cumulative abnormal return of
domestic target (-1, 1), RSIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer divided by that of target in
terms of US dollar, MBR_A: Book value of total liability plus market value of capital divided by total
assets for acquirer, MBR_T: Book value of total liability plus market value of capital divided by total
assets for target, CASH_T: Cash reserve divided by total assets of target, Ownership: Targeted stock
holding ratio announced.
Our empirical results suggest that parameters of relative firm size,
intersection variable between acquirer’s book-to-market ratio and target’s cash reserve
and ownership are significant when dependent variable is foreign acquirer’s
cumulative abnormal return in China. Here, the sign of the parameters of the
intersected variable and ownership is positive and that of relative firm size is negative.
This means that an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return is statistically high when
the acquirer has a high book-to-market ratio and the target has an ample cash reserve.
However, acquirer’s shareholder’s value is low when the acquirer is a large firm
compared with the target. This contrasts with our hypothesis. In our study, the
parameter of relative firm size is insignificant when a target’s cumulative abnormal
return is the dependent variable. In India, the parameter of intersection variable
between acquirer’s book-to-market ratio and target’s cash reserve is significantly
positive. This suggests that the acquirer’s shareholder’s value increases when the deal
is made by an acquirer with high book-to-market ratio and the target has an ample
cash reserve. A target’s shareholder’s value is also high when the deal is made by an
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acquirer with high book-to-market ratio and the target has ample cash reserve.
Table 5. about here
VI. What does the recent cross-border acquisition wave eventually brings?
In summary, our empirical results support the three hypotheses of this paper,
namely: (i) cash-rich firms are targeted in China and India as is generally done in the
industrialized countries; (ii) cross-border acquisition statistically records higher
cumulative abnormal returns than domestic acquisition; and (iii) the shareholder’s
value for acquirer is larger when the foreign acquirer purchases publicly unlisted
targets. However, one hypotheses is not supported, i.e., the relative size of an acquirer
and target does not always affect the shareholder’s value in the case of Chinese and
Indian deals.
Our empirical study used cash reserves to total assets (CASH_T) as a proxy
of firm’s internal fund. This variable implies that when the ratio is high, the target has
a room to improve the managerial discipline and the productivity as a result of
acquisition. The improved managerial discipline leads to a more efficient fixed asset
or R&D investment by using the target’s internal cash. As confirmed in several
literature, the variable CASH_T significantly influences an acquirer’s decision. This
empirical result is very remarkable in China and India because both countries
experienced approximately 10 percent economic growth, and state-owned firms also
recorded high growth rate of corporate cash inflow in recent years. In the midst of
market oriented economic reforms, a large number of firms had ample internal funds
and more rooms for reforms. Therefore, the government’s recent pronouncement
promoting acquisition is most likely to contribute to an improvement in overall
economic efficiency. Our empirical results suggest that not only foreign investors, but
domestic investors as well contributed to the improvement in cost efficiency in the
industrial organizations of China and India.
The second empirical analysis also supports the government’s recent
promotion of inward investment policy. Contrary to acquisitions in the industrialized
countries, there are still plenty of restrictions in purchasing and holding equity of
listed firms by foreigners in China and India. In addition, in both countries,
government still holds majority of publicly listed shares. This study suggests that
future deregulation of equity transaction by foreigners in a capital market will
contribute to an improvement in industrial organization and enlarge the shareholder’s
value. On the other hand, the results also suggest that it would be difficult to improve
the productivity of listed firms as long as governments remain the largest
shareholders.
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The third empirical analysis suggests that for Chinese and Indian targets,
foreign firms with high growth opportunity are good acquirers. This result has
several implications. An acquisition by a firm with high growth opportunity implies
that management of the targeted firm is influenced by managers of acquirers. Since an
acquiring firm with high growth opportunity generally has better managerial
discipline than the target, the acquisition can also contribute to an improvement of
inefficient management in China and India.
In the late 1990s, the dramatic increase in short-term investment in emerging
countries triggered the financial crisis. Based on an analysis of the firm’s micro deal
data, however, our study reveals that the recent dramatic increase in cross-border
acquisitions in transition economies does not worsen economic efficiency, but
strongly helps transition and promotion of market oriented economy.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Focusing on China and India, this paper examined the causes and
consequences of acquisitions in a transition economy. We found evidence that cash-
rich firms were targeted more frequently as similarly observed in the industrialized
countries. Our analysis also showed that cross-border acquisitions contributed to an
increase in shareholder’s value. Based on the assumption that an increase in
shareholder’s value soon after the deal announcement reflects expectations of future
overall corporate value, our results confirmed that the recent increase in cross-border
acquisition contributed to a future improvement in economic development as the two
countries pursue market oriented economic reforms.
In 1990s, international capital inflows triggered several financial crises in
emerging countries. Since these events arose, a short-term capital inflow has been
regarded as possible financial distortion in these countries. However, our empirical
study revealed that the recent trend of international capital flow, i.e., cross-border
acquisition, provide an increase in shareholder’s value for both acquirers and targets.
Furthermore, cross-border acquisition is beneficial not only for firms in emerging
countries, but also for investors in the industrialized countries. As pointed out in most
literature, a shareholder’s value for acquirers does not always increase for domestic
deals in the industrialized countries.
This paper verified not only the causes of acquisitions, but also the
consequences in a transition economy. Although our empirical analysis focused only
on China and India, our findings have important implications on the other emerging
transition countries around the world. Future studies need to examine if countries
with high growth rate, large amount of natural resources and energy exhibit similar
characteristics as we found in our study of China and India. These studies must reflect
13
how future inward investment promotional policy by acquisitions could increase
efficiency.
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Table 1. Number of M&As in China and India
(a) China Number of M&A
1998 1 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 1 (100.0%)
1999 2 0 (0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 2 (100.0%)
2000 34 1 (2.9%) 25 (73.5%) 11 (32.4%)
2001 64 2 (3.1%) 39 (60.9%) 27 (42.2%)
2002 159 22 (13.8%) 67 (42.1%) 58 (36.5%)
2003 167 15 (9.0%) 59 (35.3%) 69 (41.3%)
2004 268 9 (3.4%) 114 (42.5%) 118 (44.0%)
2005 292 14 (4.8%) 99 (33.9%) 127 (43.5%)
2006 227 7 (3.1%) 108 (47.6%) 93 (41.0%)
Total 1,214 70 (5.8%) 514 (42.3%) 506 (41.7%)
(b) India Number of M&A
1998 8 7 (87.5%) 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%)
1999 35 29 (82.9%) 7 (20.0%) 11 (31.4%)
2000 30 11 (36.7%) 9 (30.0%) 9 (30.0%)
2001 66 21 (31.8%) 18 (27.3%) 35 (53.0%)
2002 64 17 (26.6%) 9 (14.1%) 35 (54.7%)
2003 43 8 (18.6%) 22 (51.2%) 27 (62.8%)
2004 64 18 (28.1%) 24 (37.5%) 32 (50.0%)
2005 107 23 (21.5%) 38 (35.5%) 63 (58.9%)
2006 90 11 (12.2%) 37 (41.1%) 45 (50.0%)
Total 507 145 (28.6%) 165 (32.5%) 264 (52.1%)
Publicly Listed Targets Foreign Aquirers Own Industry M&A
Publicly Listed Targets Foreign Aquirers Own Industry M&A
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from Bloomberg.
Note: The sample includes all completed M&As in China and India between 1998 and 2006. Targets refer
to public, private, and subsidiary firms. Sample data consist of the announced deals with more than fifty
percent of targeted stock holding ratio in this table. No lower bound for the total amount of deal value is
set. The acquirers are all foreign and domestic listed firms except firms in the financial sector and utilities.
Acquirers with more than two deals within five business operating days are excluded from the sample.
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Table 2. Number of Takeover Activities in China and India (1998-2006)
(a) China (b) India
N %
Publicly Listed
Targets （%）
Own Industry
Acquisitions （%）
N %
Foreign
Aquirers （%）
Agriculture 18 1.5% 0.0% 44.4% 21 1.7% 38.1%
Aircraft 4 0.3% 0.0% 100.0% 6 0.5% 33.3%
Apparel 3 0.2% 0.0% 66.7% 19 1.6% 31.6%
Automobiles 34 2.8% 17.6% 52.9% 23 1.9% 43.5%
Business services 98 8.1% 1.0% 35.7% 62 5.1% 58.1%
Business supplies 1 0.1% 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Chemicals 43 3.5% 20.9% 39.5% 33 2.7% 45.5%
Computers 51 4.2% 3.9% 27.5% 46 3.8% 50.0%
Construction 41 3.4% 7.3% 43.9% 39 3.2% 41.0%
Construction materials 4 0.3% 0.0% 75.0% 3 0.2% 66.7%
Consumer goods 6 0.5% 0.0% 16.7% 8 0.7% 50.0%
Defense 2 0.2% 0.0% 50.0% 5 0.4% 0.0%
Electrical equipment 41 3.4% 7.3% 48.8% 39 3.2% 30.8%
Electronic equipment 64 5.3% 1.6% 46.9% 68 5.6% 83.8%
Entertainment 8 0.7% 0.0% 50.0% 8 0.7% 87.5%
Fabricated products 2 0.2% 50.0% 0.0% 2 0.2% 0.0%
Financial services 57 4.7% 1.8% 33.3% 124 10.2% 31.5%
Food products 59 4.9% 1.7% 44.1% 35 2.9% 51.4%
Healthcare 2 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% N.A.
Insurance 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Machinery 34 2.8% 17.6% 44.1% 47 3.9% 19.1%
Measuring and control Equipment 26 2.1% 3.8% 57.7% 20 1.6% 70.0%
Medical equipment 21 1.7% 9.5% 33.3% 21 1.7% 38.1%
Miscellaneous 149 12.3% 4.7% 32.9% 189 15.6% 40.2%
Nonmetallic mining 11 0.9% 0.0% 72.7% 9 0.7% 44.4%
Personal service 7 0.6% 0.0% 14.3% 5 0.4% 80.0%
Petroleum and natural gas 41 3.4% 12.2% 48.8% 37 3.0% 35.1%
Pharmaceutical 32 2.6% 3.1% 43.8% 27 2.2% 22.2%
Printing and publishing 8 0.7% 0.0% 25.0% 8 0.7% 37.5%
Real estate 121 10.0% 7.4% 39.7% 79 6.5% 29.1%
Recreational products 5 0.4% 0.0% 20.0% 6 0.5% 16.7%
Restaurants, motels, hotels 6 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3 0.2% 0.0%
Retail 25 2.1% 12.0% 32.0% 41 3.4% 43.9%
Rubber and plastics 8 0.7% 12.5% 75.0% 8 0.7% 50.0%
Shipbuilding, railroad 1 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% N.A.
Shipping containers 3 0.2% 0.0% 66.7% 9 0.7% 33.3%
Steel works 38 3.1% 2.6% 57.9% 35 2.9% 11.4%
Telecommunications 95 7.8% 3.2% 56.8% 87 7.2% 55.2%
Textiles 26 2.1% 11.5% 23.1% 14 1.2% 42.9%
Trading 9 0.7% 0.0% 22.2% 11 0.9% 18.2%
Transportation 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Trash and waste 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 3 0.2% 100.0%
Wholesale 10 0.8% 0.0% 50.0% 13 1.1% 61.5%
Total 1,214 100.0% 1,214 100.0%
Targets Acquirers
N %
Publicly Listed
Targets(%)
Own Industry
Acquisitions(%)
N %
Foreign
Aquirers(%)
Agriculture 11 2.2% 36.4% 36.4% 11 2.2% 27.3%
Aircraft 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Apparel 1 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% N.A.
Automobiles 16 3.2% 31.3% 56.3% 19 3.7% 21.1%
Business services 34 6.7% 44.1% 55.9% 47 9.3% 34.0%
Business supplies 44 8.7% 0.0% 0.0% 38 7.5% 0.0%
Chemicals 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Computers 16 3.2% 56.3% 56.3% 18 3.6% 22.2%
Construction 44 8.7% 13.6% 50.0% 45 8.9% 26.7%
Construction materials 16 3.2% 56.3% 93.8% 17 3.4% 17.6%
Consumer goods 2 0.4% 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.8% 0.0%
Defense 3 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 3 0.6% 0.0%
Electrical equipment 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Electronic equipment 10 2.0% 20.0% 60.0% 9 1.8% 11.1%
Entertainment 12 2.4% 33.3% 58.3% 19 3.7% 52.6%
Fabricated products 1 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1 0.2% 0.0%
Financial Services 2 0.4% 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.4% 50.0%
Food products 32 6.3% 28.1% 81.3% 29 5.7% 27.6%
Healthcare 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Insurance 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Machinery 6 1.2% 33.3% 16.7% 9 1.8% 22.2%
Measuring and control Equipment 9 1.8% 22.2% 55.6% 7 1.4% 71.4%
Medical equipment 12 2.4% 0.0% 41.7% 8 1.6% 62.5%
Miscellaneous 102 20.1% 10.8% 13.7% 78 15.4% 24.4%
Nonmetallic mining 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Personal service 5 1.0% 0.0% 40.0% 4 0.8% 100.0%
Petroleum and natural gas 13 2.6% 53.8% 46.2% 19 3.7% 26.3%
Pharmaceutical 28 5.5% 42.9% 75.0% 33 6.5% 9.1%
Printing and Publishing 2 0.4% 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.4% 50.0%
Real estate 4 0.8% 0.0% 25.0% 1 0.2% 100.0%
Recreational products 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Restaurants, motels, hotels 4 0.8% 25.0% 50.0% 2 0.4% 0.0%
Retail 4 0.8% 0.0% 50.0% 4 0.8% 25.0%
Rubber and plastics 2 0.4% 0.0% 50.0% 3 0.6% 0.0%
Shipbuilding, railroad 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Shipping Containers 3 0.6% 66.7% 33.3% 3 0.6% 33.3%
Steel works 19 3.7% 42.1% 89.5% 30 5.9% 20.0%
Telecommunications 30 5.9% 10.0% 66.7% 25 4.9% 56.0%
Textiles 19 3.7% 36.8% 31.6% 14 2.8% 0.0%
Trading 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Transportation 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Trash and waste 0 0.0% N.A. N.A. 0 0.0% N.A.
Wholesale 1 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3 0.6% 33.3%
Total 507 100.0% 507 100.0%
Targets Acquirers
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from Bloomberg
Note: This table reports, by industry, the fraction of sample firms that were acquired in 1998-2006. Targets refer to public, private, and subsidiary firms. Industry data are organized using
Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. Columns 3 and 7 report the number and percentage of acquirers and targets, respectively, in a particular industry. Columns 4 and 5
report percentage of targets publicly listed and acquired by firms in the same industry, respectively.
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Table 3. Empirical Results of Characteristics of Targets
A. China
(a)Cross-border (b) Domestic
Coefficient Z-Value Coefficient Z-Value
SIZE -0.165 ** -2.290 -0.116 ** -4.650
DER -0.025 -0.120 -0.001 -0.240
CASH 0.354 *** 2.550 0.195 1.010
FIXED -0.191 -1.250 0.013 0.950
MBR 0.001 0.320 0.002 * 1.750
Cash_Q 0.003 *** 3.330 0.001 0.210
SECTOR_1 -0.604 * -1.840 0.068 0.710
SECTOR_2 -0.250 -0.910 0.091 0.940
SECTOR_3 -0.338 -1.050 0.143 1.360
SECTOR_4 0.226 0.570 0.350 ** 2.320
SECTOR_5 -0.144 0.099 -0.496 -1.210
SECTOR_6 -0.780 0.998 -0.184 -0.980
Year_1 -0.406 -1.170 0.016 0.160
Year_2 0.423 * 1.780 0.264 *** 2.850
Year_3 -0.030 -0.120 0.308 *** 3.460
Year_4 0.141 * 1.770 0.429 *** 4.970
Year_5 0.334 ** 2.220 0.499 *** 6.200
Region_1 0.045 *** 2.540 0.198 * 1.680
Region_2 0.313 1.210 -0.043 -0.520
Region_3 -0.459 -0.900 -0.090 -0.790
Region_4 0.375 * 1.790 0.201 ** 2.290
Region_5 -0.027 0.980 -0.341 0.900
Constant -2.256 *** -3.100 -1.116 *** -5.200
Wald chi2 24.960 78.360
rho 0.454 0.036
Likelihood-Ratio Test of rho=0 17.770 *** 19.110 ***
Number of Firms 978 1,208
Observations 5,145 5,792
B. India
(a)Cross-border (b) Domestic
Coefficient Z-Value Coefficient Z-Value
SIZE 0.062 1.280 0.100 ** 2.260
DER -0.039 * -1.780 -0.031 -1.480
CASH 0.769 * 1.880 0.638 * 1.710
FIXED 0.007 0.480 -0.008 -0.290
MBR 0.003 0.410 0.004 0.030
Cash_Q 0.089 *** 2.620 0.410 * 1.770
SECTOR_1 0.196 0.960 -0.267 -1.180
SECTOR_2 0.006 0.030 -0.065 -0.290
SECTOR_3 0.214 0.950 -0.040 -0.180
SECTOR_4 -0.763 -0.987 -0.845 1.000
SECTOR_5 -0.523 -1.000 0.420 ** 2.180
SECTOR_6 -0.064 -0.230 0.382 * 1.750
Year_1 0.852 ** 1.990 -0.153 -0.650
Year_2 0.491 1.080 0.219 1.380
Year_3 0.134 0.270 -0.136 -0.630
Year_4 0.235 0.550 0.123 0.360
Year_5 -0.113 -0.350 0.339 1.480
Region_1 0.038 0.170 -0.153 -0.650
Region_2 0.139 0.850 0.219 1.380
Region_3 0.152 0.830 -0.136 -0.630
Region_4 -0.528 -0.100 0.123 0.360
Region_5 -0.113 -0.350 0.358 1.480
Constant -2.829 *** -5.550 -3.292 *** -6.200
Wald chi2 22.210 32.330
rho 0.223 0.148
Likelihood-Ratio Test of rho=0 7.520 *** 2.060 *
Number of Firms 861 924
Observations 4,470 4,562
Notes:
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1. This table represents the results of a tobit estimation that predicts which firms will be targeted in a given year. The
empirical model employs the announced targeted stock holding ratio by an acquirer as a dependent variable when the
firm is the target of an acquisition attempt and others are 0 in year t. The independent variable is one year lagged
financial data of a three-year average. Therefore, the dependent variables are virtually the announced deals in 2001-2006.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, DER is the total liability divided by market valued capital, CASH is cash
reserves divided by total assets, FIXED is fixed assets divided by total assets, ROA is return on assets, MBR is book
value of total liability plus market valued capital divided by book value of total assets.
2. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
3. In this estimation, six categories of industrial dummy variables are added based on a definition of Bloomberg’s
“Industrial Sector Level I,” i.e., Dum1: “Basic materials,” Dum2: “Communications,” Dum3: “Consumer
goods-cyclical,” Dum4: “Consumer goods-non cyclical,” Dum5: “Industrial” and Dum6: “Technology”. The definition is
different from that of table 2.
4. Five regional dummy variables for Chinese firms are set as follows. Region_1: A headquarter of the firm locates in
Beijing and Shanghai, Region_2: Fujian, GuangDong and Zhejiang, Region_3: Chilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang,
Region_4: Shandong and Hebei, Region_4: Hunan, Hubei, Henan and Shanxi, Region_5: Sichuan, Guizhou and
Chongqing.
5. Five regional dummy variables for Indian firms are as follows. Region_1: A headquarter of the firm locates in New
Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Chennai, Region_2: Maharashtra and Karnataka, Region_3: Tamil Nadu and Andra
Pradesh, Region_4: Orissa and West Bengal, Region_4: Gujarat and Rajasthan, Region_5: Haryana and Punjab.
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Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers by Type of Acquisitions
4.A. China
(a) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers of Cross-border and Domestic M&A
(-1, 1) Mean 1.70% *** [4.00] 2.47% *** [3.57] 0.51% ** [2.22] 2.50% *** [2.77]
Median 0.81% *** [4.41] 1.24% ** [2.39] 0.21% *** [3.71] 1.03% * [1.76]
(-20, 20) Mean 4.92% *** [3.20] 7.92% * [1.90] 0.66% [1.20] 7.26% * [1.70]
Median 2.13% *** [3.24] 3.42% * [1.65] 0.34% [1.15] 3.08% * [1.60]
Observations 828 484 344
All Cross-border Domestic Difference
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
(b) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers by Type of Targets
All Difference
(-1, 1) Cross-border Mean 2.47% *** [3.57] 1.84% ** [2.35] 2.55% *** [3.76] -0.71% ** [2.11]
Median 1.24% ** [2.39] 0.94% [1.17] 1.23% *** [3.55] -0.29% [0.12]
(-20, 20) Cross-border Mean 7.92% * [1.90] 4.85% [1.58] 8.31% ** [2.11] -3.46% * [1.71]
Median 3.42% * [1.65] 2.98% [1.05] 3.44% [0.79] -0.46% [0.19]
Observations 484 17 467
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
Public Target Private Target
(c) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers by Type of Industrial Sector
All Own-Industry Non-Own Industry
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
(-1, 1) Cross-border Mean 2.47% *** [3.57] 4.44% ** [1.97] 2.11% *** [3.86] 2.33% *** [2.56]
Median 1.24% ** [2.39] 1.93% [1.09] 1.10% *** [3.11] 0.83% [0.31]
(-20, 20) Cross-border Mean 7.92% * [1.90] 11.45% * [2.00] 7.24% * [1.77] 4.21% * [2.05]
Median 3.42% * [1.65] 4.87% [1.31] 3.16% * [1.84] 1.71% [0.15]
Observations 484 73 411
Notes:
1. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers are calculated for the three-day (-1, 1) and 40 one-day (-20,
20) events around the announcement of a takeover. Abnormal returns are estimated using market index
returns of mother country market of each acquirer. The parameters for the market model are estimated
over the (-256,-21) interval. All acquirers are publicly traded listed on the domestic/foreign stock
exchange.
2. Each industrial sector of the sample deal is defined based on Table 2.
3. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level and * denotes
significance at 10 percent level.
4.B. India
(a) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers of Cross-border and Domestic M&A
(-1, 1） Mean 1.20% *** [2.95] 1.96% ** [1.99] 0.99% *** [3.11] 0.97% *** [2.95]
Median 0.55% * [1.68] 0.92% ** [2.20] 0.40% ** [2.05] 0.52% *** [3.11]
(-20, 20) Mean 5.33% *** [2.86] 9.88% * [1.70] 3.45% ** [1.98] 6.43% *** [3.00]
Median 2.16% * [1.70] 4.33% * [1.81] 1.27% [1.10] 3.06% * [1.88]
Observations 489 143 346
All Cross-border Domestic Difference
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
(b) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers by Type of Targets
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All Public Private Difference
(-1, 1) Cross-border Mean 1.96% ** [1.99] 0.90% [1.41] 2.76% * [2.02] -1.86% * [-2.00]
Median 0.92% ** [2.20] 0.13% [1.12] 1.16% * [1.99] -1.03% * [-1.91]
(-20, 20) Cross-border Mean 9.88% * [1.70] 8.93% [1.10] 10.53% * [1.88] -1.60% ** [-2.02]
Median 4.33% * [1.81] 3.61% [0.69] 4.53% [1.21] -0.92% [-0.96]
Observations 143 31 112
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
(c) Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquirers by Type of Industrial Sector
All Own-Industry Non-Own Industry
(-1, 1) Cross-border Mean 1.96% ** [1.99] 3.20% [1.11] 1.39% ** [2.01] 1.81% ** [2.05]
Median 0.92% ** [2.20] 1.44% [0.47] 0.68% ** [2.21] 0.76% * [1.62]
(-20, 20) Cross-border Mean 9.88% * [1.70] 13.97% [1.19] 8.02% *** [3.11] 5.95% * [1.98]
Median 4.33% * [1.81] 5.62% [0.33] 3.96% * [1.80] 1.66% [0.61]
Observations 143 44 99
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
Notes:
1. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers are calculated for the three-day (-1, 1) and forty one-day
(-20, 20) event around the announcement of a takeover. Abnormal returns are estimated using market
index returns of mother country market of each acquirer. The parameters for the market model are
estimated over the (-256,-21) interval. All acquirers are publicly traded listed on the domestic/foreign
stock exchange.
2. Each industrial sector of the sample deal is defined based on Table 2.
3. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level and * denotes
significance at 10 percent level.
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Table 5. Empirical Results of Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(A) China
(a) Foreign Acquirer's CARs (b)Domest Target's CARs
Coefficient Z-Value Coefficient Z-Value
RSIZE -4.760E-07 -0.100 -4.270E-06 -0.450
MBR_A 0.001 0.260 3.733E-04 0.040
MBR_A/MBR_T 0.002 0.550 0.016 ** 2.410
MBR_A*Cash_T 0.093 *** 3.150 0.116 ** 2.010
Ownership 4.934E-04 *** 6.880 0.001 *** 10.040
Year00 -0.009 * -1.720 -0.022 ** -2.160
Year01 -0.014 ** -2.430 -0.019 -1.620
Year02 -0.011 ** -2.270 -0.015 -1.490
Year03 0.005 1.020 -0.002 -0.280
Year04 3.464E-04 0.040 -0.003 -0.220
Constant 0.003 0.070 -0.004 *** -0.470
LR Chi2 63.610 *** 94.290 ***
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.142
Observations 177 177
Notes:
1. Tobit estimation of the acquirer’s and target’s three-day cumulative abnormal return on the following
variables: RSIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer divided by that of target in terms of US
dollar, MBR_A and MBR_T are book value of total liability plus market value of capital divided by total
assets for acquirer and target, respectively. CASH_T is cash reserve divided by total assets of target.
Ownership is targeted stock holding ratio of target by acquirer announced.
2. Each industrial sector of the sample deal is defined based on Table 2.
3. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level and * denotes
significance at 10 percent level.
(B) India
(a) Foreign Acquirer's CARs (b)Domest Target's CARs
Coefficient Z-Value Coefficient Z-Value
RSIZE 6.600E-08 0.310 2.010E-08 0.210
MBR_A -0.002 -1.580 -0.001 * -1.680
MBR_A/MBR_T 2.547E-04 0.350 -5.650E-05 -0.170
MBR_A*Cash_T 0.005 * 1.720 0.003 ** 2.100
Ownership 0.001 *** 6.130 0.002 *** 19.180
Year00 -0.007 -1.600 0.004 ** 2.140
Year01 -0.008 ** -2.540 -0.002 -1.420
Year02 -0.006 * -1.670 -0.001 -0.460
Year03 -0.008 ** -2.090 -0.001 -0.820
Year04 -5.559E-03 * -1.650 -0.004 ** -2.340
Constant 0.010 *** 2.910 0.003 ** 2.020
LR Chi2 43.790 *** 313.100 ***
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.074
Observations 776 776
Notes:
1. Tobit estimation of the acquirer’s three day cumulative abnormal return on the on the following
variables. RSIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer divided by that of target in terms of US
dollar. MBR_A and MBR_T are book value of total liability plus market value of capital divided by total
assets for acquirer and target, respectively. CASH_T is cash reserve divided by total assets of target.
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Ownership is targeted stock holding ratio of target by acquirer announced.
2. Each industrial sector of the sample deal is defined based on Table 2.
3. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level and * denotes
significance at 10 percent level.
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APPENDIX 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Targets of Cross-border and Domestic
M&A
Tables A.a and A.b show the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of targets
classified by cross-border and domestic deals(?) in China and India. In the tables, CARs of full
targets sample is significantly negative in China. However, when we separate the target
samples we find contradictory results between cross-border and domestic deals. We find that
the CARs is significantly positive for cross-border deals, and significantly negative for the
domestic. As shown in the table, a foreign acquirer significantly increases shareholder’s value in
China, while a domestic acquirer reduces the shareholder’s value. In India, the results for all
samples show that CARs of both cross-border and domestic are significantly positive, and
cross-border is not significantly different from domestic acquisition. Empirical results suggest
that either domestic or cross-border acquisition can bring significant additional shareholder’s
value in India. The methodology used in the tables below is same as that of the second
empirical analysis in this paper. We show this empirical results to point out that cross-border
deals also provide merits to shareholders of targets. The third empirical analysis also uses the
CAR of each individual firm.
A. China
(-1, 1) Mean -0.55 ** [-2.53] 0.82 * [1.76] -0.51 *** [-2.99] 1.34 ** [2.17]
Median -0.29 *** [-2.64] 0.43 [1.52] -0.31 *** [-3.13] 0.74 ** [2.10]
Observations 427 32 395
All Cross-border Domestic Difference
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
B. India
(-1, 1) Mean 48.81 *** [4.89] 48.56 *** [2.96] 48.98 *** [3.88] -0.42 [0.28]
Median 15.29 *** [5.55] 25.57 *** [3.50] 10.94 *** [4.27] 14.63 [0.95]
Observations 118 47 71
Cross-border Domestic Difference
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
All
Notes:
1. The parameters for the market model are estimated over the (-256,-6) interval. All targets are publicly
traded listed on the domestic/foreign stock exchange.
2. ***denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level and ***denotes
significance at 10 percent level.
APPENDIX 2. Descriptive Statistics of Empirical Studies of Characteristics of Targets
The table below provides the descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 3 of this paper.
SHR is the announced targeted stock holding ratio by acquirer, SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets, DER is the total liability divided by market valued capital, CASH is cash reserves
divided by total assets, FIXED is fixed assets divided by total assets, ROA is return on assets,
MBR is book value of total liability plus market valued capital divided by book value of total
assets. Sample period of the data is 1999-2006 for dependent variable and 1998-2005 for the
independent variables. The latter is a three-year average. Non-targeted firms by domestic
acquirers and foreign acquirers are partly overwrapped, while targeted firms by domestic
acquirers and foreign acquirers are not. Overwrapped targeted firms are excluded from the
sample. Panel tobit estimation is employed to estimate our empirical equation model. Other
than the below variables, three kinds of dummy variables are added. Namely, industrial
dummies, year dummies and regional dummies.
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A. China
SHR SIZE DER CASH FIXED ROA MBR
1. Firms not Targeted by Mean 0.000 6.426 0.511 0.476 0.677 0.064 2.303
Domestic Acquirer S.D. 0.000 1.242 0.524 0.181 0.221 0.087 1.344
(N=947) Max 0.000 11.560 9.961 0.961 1.000 0.431 20.456
Min 0.000 0.354 0.005 0.012 0.048 -1.338 0.738
2. Firms Targeted by Mean 0.282 6.151 0.842 0.506 0.665 0.048 1.437
Domestic Acquirer S.D. 0.155 1.593 0.458 0.200 0.247 0.063 0.337
(N=261) Max 1.000 9.162 2.031 0.851 0.989 0.192 2.455
Min 0.110 1.073 0.075 0.107 0.143 -0.125 1.050
3. Firms not Targeted by Mean 0.000 6.425 0.512 0.477 0.677 0.064 2.299
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.000 1.244 0.524 0.182 0.221 0.087 1.343
(N=944) Max 0.000 11.560 9.961 0.961 1.000 0.431 20.456
Min 0.000 0.354 0.005 0.012 0.048 -1.338 0.738
4. Firms Targeted by Mean 0.309 6.478 0.571 0.522 0.500 0.069 1.795
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.240 2.456 0.087 0.289 0.220 0.073 0.097
(N=34) Max 1.000 8.214 0.632 0.726 0.972 0.120 1.864
Min 0.125 4.741 0.509 0.318 0.122 0.017 1.727
Total Mean 0.283 6.425 0.512 0.477 0.677 0.064 2.299
(N=1,239) S.D. 0.161 1.244 0.524 0.181 0.221 0.087 1.343
Max 1.000 11.560 9.961 0.961 1.000 0.431 20.456
Min 0.110 0.354 0.005 0.012 0.048 -1.338 0.738
B. India
SHR SIZE DER CASH FIXED ROA MBR
1. Firms not Targeted by Mean 0.000 7.897 3.770 0.482 0.626 0.113 1.543
Domestic Acquirer S.D. 0.000 1.547 8.965 0.203 0.236 0.115 1.466
(N=764) Max 0.000 14.237 127.438 0.996 1.000 0.826 19.953
Min 0.000 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.006 -1.672 0.088
2. Firms Targeted by Mean 0.716 8.371 1.961 0.497 0.581 0.134 1.335
Domestic Acquirer S.D. 0.336 1.816 3.210 0.211 0.229 0.231 0.640
(N=160) Max 1.000 12.218 18.970 0.914 0.998 1.598 3.390
Min 0.100 4.762 0.031 0.062 0.101 -0.123 0.563
3. Firms not Targeted by Mean 0.000 7.899 3.774 0.483 0.626 0.113 1.537
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.000 1.556 8.970 0.203 0.236 0.117 14.464
(N=764) Max 0.000 14.237 127.438 0.996 1.000 1.598 19.953
Min 0.000 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.006 -1.672 0.088
4. Firms Targeted by Mean 0.604 8.107 1.808 0.415 0.585 0.131 1.788
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.342 1.015 3.074 0.214 0.210 0.080 1.091
(N=97) Max 1.000 9.757 13.921 0.824 0.930 0.319 5.891
Min 0.100 4.922 0.032 0.067 0.275 -0.046 0.541
Total Mean 0.673 7.902 3.751 0.483 0.626 0.113 1.540
(N=1,021) S.D. 0.343 1.551 8.926 0.203 0.236 0.116 1.460
Max 1.000 14.237 127.438 0.996 1.000 1.598 19.953
Min 0.100 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.006 -1.672 0.088
APPENDIX 3. Descriptive Statistics of Empirical Studies of Determinants of Cumulative
Abnormal Return
The table below provides the descriptive statistics of variables in Table 5 of this paper. CAR_A and
CAR_T are the acquirer’s and target’s three-day cumulative abnormal return. RSIZE is natural logarithm
of total assets of acquirer divided by that of target in terms of US dollar, MBR_A and MBR_T are book
value of total liability plus market value of capital divided by total assets for acquirer and target,
respectively. CASH_T is cash reserve divided by total assets of target. Ownership is targeted stock holding
ratio of target announced by acquirer. Sample period of the data is 2000-2005 for both dependent and
independent variables. Non-targeted firms are defined as firms that belong to the same industrial category
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of table 2 as targets on every deal, but not targeted. Tobit estimation model is employed to estimate our
empirical model. The dataset of this empirical study is not cross-sectional panel data, but cross-sectional
data. However, we added year dummy variables since each deals is made in different year. Both (-1, 1)
window data is used for CAR_A and CAR_T, while we estimated both (-1, 1) and (-20,20) in our study.
The latter is calculated to reconfirm the result of the former. We extracted deal data for more than 10
percent targeted stock holding ratio when it is announced, but the average of “ownership” is less than 10
percent in the below table because the dataset contains potential targeted firm data that belongs to the
same industrial categories of the target, but not targeted. In this case, ownership ratio is “0”, so that , the
average is less than what was defined.
A. China
CAR_A CAR_T RSIZE MBR_A MBR_T Cash_T Ownership
1. Deals not Targeted by Mean 0.000 0.000 221.035 1.347 2.124 0.068 0.000
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.000 0.000 266.745 0.436 1.303 0.045 0.000
(N=146) Max 0.000 0.000 972.200 2.368 7.942 0.197 0.000
Min 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.659 0.000 0.000
2. Deals Targeted by Mean 0.030 0.068 36.052 1.404 3.185 0.081 0.352
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.030 0.063 71.054 0.418 4.184 0.055 0.239
(N=31) Max 0.097 0.316 341.800 2.583 19.114 0.237 1.000
Min 0.003 0.018 0.100 0.585 0.777 0.007 0.100
Total Mean 0.005 0.010 187.302 1.356 2.279 0.071 0.053
(N=177) S.D. 0.016 0.034 253.239 0.433 2.040 0.047 0.156
Max 0.097 0.316 972.200 2.583 19.114 0.237 1.000
Min 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.659 0.007 0.000
B. India
CAR_A CAR_T RSIZE MBR_A MBR_T Cash_T Ownership
1. Deals not Targeted by Mean 0.000 0.000 14.652 1.711 1.746 0.035 0.000
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.000 0.000 207.468 1.202 1.579 0.052 0.000
(N=744) Max 0.000 0.000 972.200 9.767 13.330 0.429 0.000
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.238 0.000 0.000
2. Deals Targeted by Mean 0.120 0.059 65.630 1.981 2.471 0.040 0.174
Foreign Acquirer S.D. 0.160 0.063 68.472 0.964 1.364 0.053 0.199
(N=32) Max 0.515 0.316 334.000 3.660 5.891 0.267 1.000
Min 0.003 0.003 3.000 0.881 0.928 0.002 0.000
Total Mean 0.005 0.002 143.614 1.722 1.775 0.035 0.007
(N=776) S.D. 0.039 0.017 204.532 1.193 1.577 0.052 0.051
Max 0.515 0.316 972.200 9.767 13.330 0.429 1.000
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.238 0.000 0.000
APPENDIX 4. Additional Tests for Characteristics of Targets and Determinants of CARs
These tables summarize the results of regressions of alternate OLS specifications of equation
(3.1), (5.1) and (5.2). “4.1” and “4.2” are controlled for potential violation of statistical assumptions
underlying the OLS regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
4.1 Robustness Checks of Characteristics of Cross-border M&A Targets
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(A) Cross-border M&A in China (B) Cross-border M&A in India
(1) (2) (1) (2)
SIZE -0.150 *** (-2.760) -0.144 ** (-2.220) 0.001 (1.180) 0.001 (0.920)
DER -0.001 (-0.240) -4.0E-04 (-0.070) -0.002 (-1.170) -0.011 (-0.980)
CASH 0.180 ** (2.060) 0.134 * (1.810) 0.189 * (1.930) 0.171 * (1.680)
CASH*CASH -0.110 (-0.760) -0.001 (-0.660)
FIXED -0.048 (-0.310) -0.017 (-0.440) 0.003 (0.520) 0.001 (0.490)
MBR 0.005 (0.290) 0.004 (0.640) -0.004 (-0.250) -0.002 (-0.170)
MBR*MBR -0.001 (-0.370) -0.002 (-0.390)
Cash_Q 0.001 ** (2.020) 0.004 ** (1.960) 0.002 ** (2.430) 0.001 ** (2.090)
SECTOR_1 3.7E-04 ** (2.340) 4.2E-04 ** (2.440) 0.003 (0.700) 0.004 (0.930)
SECTOR_2 -0.003 (-0.020) -0.003 (-0.070) -0.002 (-0.390) -0.001 (-0.440)
SECTOR_3 0.006 *** (3.200) 0.001 *** (3.400) 0.002 (0.450) 0.007 (0.450)
SECTOR_4 0.001 (0.050) 2.3E-05 (0.070) -0.017 (-0.160) -0.210 (-0.210)
SECTOR_5 1.0E-04 (0.020) 0.001 (0.050) -0.012 (-1.000) -0.009 (-0.880)
SECTOR_6 0.001 (0.020) 5.1E-06 (0.070) -0.003 (-0.480) -0.003 (-0.130)
Year_1 0.001 (0.070) 1.5E-05 (0.060) -0.001 (-0.280) -0.004 (-0.330)
Year_2 8.7E-05 (0.100) 1.4E-04 (0.090) -7.9E-05 (-0.020) -1.4E-04 (-0.010)
Year_3 5.9E-05 (0.070) 5.1E-05 (0.070) 2.0E-04 (0.040) 3.4E-04 (0.040)
Year_4 0.004 (0.050) 0.001 (0.050) -0.006 (-1.130) -0.004 (-1.330)
Year_5 0.002 (0.030) 0.005 (0.020) 0.013 ** (2.470) 0.004 ** (2.220)
Region_1 -5.6E-05 (-0.060) -0.002 (-0.050) 0.002 (0.360) 0.001 (0.110)
Region_2 0.009 (1.290) 2.4E-04 (1.240) 0.003 (0.660) 0.007 (0.740)
Region_3 -6.3E-05 (-0.070) -3.5E-04 (-0.060) 0.004 (0.940) 0.006 (0.990)
Region_4 0.001 (1.310) 1.5E-04 (1.440) 0.010 (-1.140) 0.008 (-1.130)
Region_5 -0.001 (-0.080) -0.001 (-0.030) -0.003 (-0.400) -0.001 (-0.200)
Constant 0.001 (0.370) 0.007 (0.031) 0.009 (0.830) 0.009 (0.770)
R-squared 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001
Observations 5,928 5,928 4,950 4,950
4.2 Robustness Checks of Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(A) Cross-border M&A in China (B) Cross-border M&A in India
(1) Acquirer's CARs (2) Target's CARs (1) Acquirer's CARs (2) Target's CARs
RSIZE -2.3E-06 (-0.320) -6.6E-06 (-0.170) 9.3E-09 (0.030) -1.3E-08 (0.120)
MBR_A/MBR_T 0.010 (0.790) 0.001 (0.820) 0.001 (0.380) 0.026 * (1.680)
MBR_A 0.003 (0.830) 0.002 (0.710) 0.001 (0.710) 2.8E-04 (0.580)
MBR_A*MBR_A -0.043 (-0.470) -0.033 (-0.550) -0.047 (-0.170) -0.007 (-0.780)
Cash_T 0.074 (1.140) 0.037 (0.470) 0.001 (1.190) 8.6E-05 (0.240)
Cash_T*Cash_T -0.018 (-0.740) -0.001 (-0.700) -0.007 (-0.850) -0.004 (-0.340)
MBR_A*Cash_T 0.110 *** (3.220) 0.010 * (1.770) 0.019 * (1.840) 0.006 * (1.670)
Ownership 4.7E-04 *** (4.440) 0.014 *** (9.510) 0.001 *** (4.240) 0.002 *** (16.740)
Year00 -0.007 (-1.460) -0.019 * (-1.970) -0.002 (-1.190) 0.005 ** (2.100)
Year01 -0.009 * (-1.710) -0.011 (-2.040) -0.007 * (-1.750) -0.001 (-0.770)
Year02 -0.008 * (-1.650) -0.003 (-1.020) -0.006 (-1.330) -0.001 (-0.280)
Year03 0.006 (1.140) -0.001 (-0.120) -0.007 (-1.500) -2.4E-04 (-0.130)
Year04 0.003 (0.900) -0.003 (-0.070) -0.007 (-1.220) -0.002 (-0.220)
Constant 0.004 (0.930) 4.0E-04 (0.060) 0.005 (1.330) 0.001 (0.690)
R-squared 0.217 0.366 0.036 0.271
Observations 177 177 798 798
